December 10, 2018

Samantha Deshommes, Chief
Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20529-2140

Re: DHS Docket No. USCIS-2010-0012, RIN 1615-AA22, Comments in Response to Proposed Rulemaking: Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds

Dear Ms. Deshommes:

We, the 111 undersigned Members of Congress, submit this comment in opposition to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) proposed rule, “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,” published October 10, 2018 (DHS Docket No. USCIS-2010-0012). As Members of Congress, we have a strong interest in ensuring that DHS and other executive agencies appropriately apply the law that Congress has enacted. We also have a strong interest in promoting the health and economic well-being of the Nation, including by ensuring that individuals are able to access the supplemental medical, nutrition, and housing assistance for which they are statutorily eligible and that are intended to improve general health outcomes and economic opportunity for working communities. The proposed rule fails on each of these counts.

As explained further below, DHS is seeking to circumvent Congress by administratively altering the 135-year-old meaning of the term “public charge” in violation of congressional intent. Since the term was first codified as an immigration restriction in 1882, it has been consistently interpreted to mean an individual who is, or is likely to become, primarily dependent on the government for his or her care (i.e., someone who is effectively a “charge” or ward of the state). Over the years, the method for determining such “primary dependence” has changed, but the principle itself has remained steadfast. Importantly, Congress has amended the statutory ground of inadmissibility several times since 1882, but it has never changed this longstanding primary meaning. Indeed, Congress has rejected the very changes that DHS now seeks to implement administratively.

---

Nevertheless, DHS now proposes to deviate from the original meaning of the term, and subsequent congressional ratifications of that meaning, by dramatically altering the definition of “public charge” through this rulemaking. Under the proposed rule, the term would no longer mean an individual who is primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. Instead, the rule would redefine the term to mean one who receives about $1800 per year in supplemental medical, nutritional, or housing assistance—even if the person is legally eligible for that assistance and regardless of the individual’s ability to subsist without it. This change and others in the proposed rule are simply not consistent with congressional intent.

The rule is also extremely dangerous. The Administration admits that the rule would effectively penalize individuals for receiving supplemental public benefits for which they are legally entitled. Not only does this violate our clear intent to expand the use of such programs, it would have a profound negative impact on the health, safety, and economic well-being of communities across the country. The proposed rule expressly concedes that it may make America sicker and poorer, including through: “worse health outcomes, including increased prevalence of obesity and malnutrition, especially for pregnant or breastfeeding women, infants, or children”; “increased prevalence of communicable diseases”; “increased rates of poverty”; “increased rates of instability”; “reduced productivity”; and “reduced educational attainment.” In other words, DHS knows this rule will harm American families and communities across the nation.

For these reasons and the others discussed below, we urge the Department to abandon this rulemaking and maintain the long-standing principles embodied in currently operative field guidance.²

1. The Proposed Rule Violates Congressional Intent Behind the Public Charge Statute.

As discussed below, DHS seeks through the proposed rule to deviate significantly from the congressional intent behind public charge. For more than 135 years, the term has been intended and understood to refer to an individual who is, or is likely to become, primarily dependent on the government for his or her care. The term has generally been applied to individuals who need long-term institutional care or who are dependent on cash assistance for their subsistence. Consistent with this history, DHS currently applies the term to an individual who is, or is likely to be, either: (1) primarily dependent on certain cash benefits for income maintenance (specifically, Supplemental Security Income, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or similar state or local cash assistance); or (2) institutionalized in primarily government-funded long-term care. DHS now seeks to redefine “public charge” to include anyone who receives about $1800 per year—about $5 per day—in supplemental medical, nutritional, or housing assistance. DHS proposes this change even though such programs were designed by Congress to improve health outcomes and economic opportunity for working communities, and not to provide critical subsistence for those who cannot otherwise care for themselves. The fact that DHS’s proposal covers such benefits—including for those who are

² DHS should consider all citations to supporting evidence and authority as part of the formal administrative record for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Throughout the comments that follow, we have included numerous citations to supporting evidence and authority, including direct links. We direct DHS to each citation and request that the full text of the evidence and authority cited, along with the full text of our comment, be incorporated into and considered part of the formal administrative record for purposes of the APA.
legally eligible for the benefits, and irrespective of the individual’s ability to subsist without them—is simply not consistent with congressional intent.

a. The Original Meaning of Public Charge.

There is little question that the term “public charge” originally referred to persons who could not care for themselves and were thus primarily dependent on the public for support. The first federal statute banning the admission of aliens based on public charge grounds was included in the Immigration Act of 1882. That statute specifically denied admission to “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.” This provision was modeled on state immigration laws developed in New York and Massachusetts that sought to deny admission to individuals who could not provide for themselves and would thus end up in publicly-funded almshouses or asylums. For example, a New York state law enacted in 1847 prohibited the landing of “any lunatic, idiot, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm persons, not members of emigrating families, and who are likely to become permanently a public charge.” These and similar statutes clearly indicated the intent to ban individuals who through moral, mental, or physical deficiencies could not care for themselves. They did not, however, ban individuals who were capable of providing for themselves but who could also, because of their situation in life, benefit from supplemental assistance as they worked to become increasingly self-sufficient.

This original meaning is consistent with the plain meaning of the words “public charge.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), for example, defines charge as “[a] person or thing committed to the care of another.” And it specifically defines public charge as “[a]n indigent; [a] person whom it is necessary to support at public expense by reason of poverty alone or illness and poverty.” Both of these definitions suggest individuals who are incapable of providing for themselves and are thus necessarily dependent on the public for their support. They do not suggest individuals who are capable of providing for themselves, even if they could simultaneously benefit from supplemental assistance as they do so.

This original meaning of public charge is thereafter reinforced over the years, through additional legislation and judicial and administrative case law. In the decades following 1882, for example, Congress passed numerous laws that continued to list the term “public charge” after other, more specific conditions for individuals who would be generally incapable of providing for themselves and would thus become primarily dependent on public support. In 1891, Congress excluded “[a]ll idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge.” In 1907, Congress expanded on the categories of excludable individuals to include

---

4 Id.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
“epileptics” and “professional beggars,” while also adding a new catch-all provision that clearly reflected the congressional intent behind its list of specific exclusions.\textsuperscript{10} This catch-all provision covered “persons not comprehended within any of the foregoing excluded classes who are found to be and are certified by the examining surgeon as being mentally or physically defective, such mental or physical defect being of a nature which may affect the ability of such alien to earn a living.”\textsuperscript{11} In 1917, Congress again included this catch-all provision in its revised list of excludable aliens.\textsuperscript{12}

This public charge language remained unchanged for the next 35 years until Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,\textsuperscript{13} the modern codification of immigration and naturalization law. In that act, Congress excluded various groups of individuals who could become primarily dependent on the government for support. These included: (1) those with “a physical defect, disease, or disability . . . of such a nature that it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not have to earn a living;” (2) those who are “paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants;” and (3) those “who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission, are likely at any time to become public charges.”\textsuperscript{14} It is the language in this third section that has survived into current law, while the first two sections were subsequently eliminated.

The contemporaneous interpretations of the judiciary and executive officers tasked with administering the various acts above only confirm the congressional intent behind the public charge provisions. For example, a federal court in 1887 analyzed the original public charge language from the Immigration Act of 1882 and concluded that “the ultimate fact which the commissioners are called on to decide [is] whether these immigrants were unable to take care of themselves.”\textsuperscript{15} In 1949, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) sustained the appeal of a mother and child who had been excluded on the 1917 public charge grounds after their husband/father was excluded for criminal reasons.\textsuperscript{16} The Board noted that the mother was “quite capable of earning her own livelihood independent of her husband” and the child had training in an industry that “presents a wide field for employment in this country.”\textsuperscript{17}

Similarly, the Attorney General determined in 1964 that the public charge provision in the 1952 Act requires the presence of some “specific circumstances, such as mental or physical disability, advanced age, or other facts reasonably tending to show that the burden of supporting the alien is likely to be cast on the public.”\textsuperscript{18} The Attorney General further concluded that “[a] healthy person in the prime of life cannot ordinarily be considered likely to become a public

\textsuperscript{10} Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898.
\textsuperscript{11} Id.
\textsuperscript{12} Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874.
\textsuperscript{13} Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
\textsuperscript{14} Id. §§ 212(a)(7), (8), and (15)
\textsuperscript{15} In re O’Sullivan, 31 F. 447, 449 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
\textsuperscript{17} Id.
charge, especially where he has friends or relatives in the United States who have indicated their ability and willingness to come to his assistance in case of emergency.”19 In 1988, the BIA sustained the appeal of an alien who had been denied immigration benefits under the same public charge provision, in part because her family had received “public cash assistance” while being unemployed for nearly four years.20 In sustaining the appeal, the Board noted that the alien was “young” and had no “physical or mental defect which might affect her earning capacity.”21 The Board also noted that the alien had recently begun working, and that during the time when she was absent from the workforce, she had been caring for her children.22


In support of the proposed rule, DHS places considerable weight on changes to the public charge provision under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),23 as well as changes to public benefit eligibility under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).24 Neither act, however, did anything to change the longstanding meaning of the public charge provision. PRWORA limited immigrant eligibility for certain means-tested federal benefits, but it did not modify or address the public charge ground of inadmissibility in any way. IIRIRA did modify the public charge statute in several ways, including by: (1) codifying the “totality of the circumstances” test that had developed through case law over the years;25 (2) requiring adjudicators to consider certain specific factors—age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills—when applying that test;26 and requiring legally enforceable affidavit of support, while limiting the categories of people who could provide such affidavits.27 The act did not, however, affect the longstanding meaning of public charge.

Indeed, the very change that DHS seeks to accomplish in this rulemaking was considered and rejected in the legislative process leading to the passage of IIRIRA. H.R. 2202 of the 104th Congress, the House bill that would eventually become IIRIRA, passed the House on March 21, 1996, with language substantially similar to the change proposed by DHS.28 Section 622(a) of that bill included a provision generally defining public charge to include an alien who “receives benefits . . . under one or more of the public assistance programs described in subparagraph (D) for an aggregate period . . . of at least 12 months within 7 years after the date of entry.”29 The public assistance programs listed in subparagraph (D) expressly included Medicaid, food stamp,
and housing assistance programs. Those provisions, however, were rejected in conference and not included in the enacted version of IIRIRA.

The fact that IIRIRA and PRWORA failed to change the longstanding meaning of the “public charge” ground was immediately understood by the various public agencies tasked with administering the statute. In 1997 and 1998, both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department clarified to its respective officers that IIRIRA now required legally enforceable affidavits of support, but that the act had otherwise failed to change the substance of the public charge ground. On December 16, 1997, for example, the INS issued guidance stating that “[e]xcept for the new requirements concerning the enforceable affidavit of support, [IIRIRA] has not altered the standards used to determine the likelihood of an alien to become a public charge nor has it significantly changed the criteria to be considered in determining such a likelihood.”

Similarly, on June 8, 1998, the State Department issued a cable clarifying that IIRIRA’s principal change was to require “a legally enforceable affidavit of support” and that the act had “not changed the long-standing legal presumption that an able-bodied, employable individual will be able to work upon arrival in the United States” and thus not become a public charge. A separate cable noted that “[t]here is no ground of ineligibility based solely on the prior receipt of public benefits” and that “in most cases, prior receipt of benefits, by itself, should not lead to an automatic finding of ineligibility.”

Subsequently, on May 26, 1999, the INS published two documents in the Federal Register to “help alleviate public confusion over the meaning of the term ‘public charge’ in immigration law and its relationship to the receipt of Federal, State, and local public benefits” and to “provide aliens with better guidance as to the types of public benefits that will and will not be considered in public charge determinations.” The first was a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which the INS proposed to define “public charge” to mean an individual “who is likely to become . . . primarily dependent on the Government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at Government expense.” The second was INS Field Guidance that “both

---

30 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 138.
31 Compare H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. § 622(a) with Pub. L. 104-208, § 551.
33 DEP’T OF STATE, I-864 AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT: UPDATE NO. 14 – COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, UNCLASSIFIED STATE 102426 (cable dated June 8, 1998). The cable further provided that “[t]he presumption that the applicant will find work coupled with the fact that the [affidavit of support] is a legally enforceable contract will provide in most cases a sufficient basis to accept a sponsor’s . . . technically sufficient [affidavit] as overcoming the public charge ground.” Id.
34 DEP’T OF STATE, I-864 AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT UPDATE NO. ONE – PUBLIC CHARGE ISSUES, UNCLASSIFIED STATE 228862 (cable dated Dec. 1997). The cable further clarified that “[i]f there is a sufficient Affidavit of Support and the applicant appears to be able to support him/herself and dependents, a public charge finding may not be appropriate notwithstanding the petitioner’s reliance on public assistance.” Id.
36 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, at 28,677 (proposed May 26, 1999) [hereinafter “1999 INS NPRM’’].
summarize[d] longstanding law with respect to public charge and provide[d] new guidance on public charge determinations.”

Through this Field Guidance, the INS was able to immediately adopt the definition in the proposed rule as a means of addressing public confusion “while allowing the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.”

The INS provided several reasons for deciding to adopt the definition of public charge in both the 1999 proposed rule and the Field Guidance. Each of these reasons reflect the widely-understood congressional intent behind the public charge statute:

1. First, the INS noted that uncertainty following IIRIRA was “undermining the Government’s policies of increasing access to health care and helping people to become self-sufficient.” As the INS explained, “confusion about the relationship between the receipt of public benefits and the concept of ‘public charge’” had “deterred eligible aliens and their families, including U.S. citizen children, from seeking important health and nutrition benefits that they are legally entitled to receive.” Furthermore, this “reluctance to access benefits has an adverse impact not just on the potential recipients, but on public health and the general welfare.”

2. Second, the INS observed that non-cash benefits “are by their nature supplemental and do not, alone or in combination, provide sufficient resources to support an individual or family.” Thus, by focusing only on cash assistance for income maintenance, the Service could “identify those who are primarily dependent on the government for subsistence without inhibiting access to non-cash benefits that serve important public interests.”

3. Third, the INS acknowledged that “federal, state, and local benefits are increasingly being made available to families with incomes far above the poverty level, reflecting broad public policy decisions about improving general public health and nutrition, promoting education, and assisting working-poor families in the process of becoming self-sufficient.” INS therefore concluded that “participation in such non-cash programs is not evidence of poverty or dependence.”

The INS also noted that its proposed definition was consistent with the advice provided by federal benefit-granting agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Agriculture, and the Social Security Administration. Each department had concurred that “receipt of cash assistance for income maintenance is the best evidence of primary dependence on the Government” because “non-cash benefits generally provide supplementary

38 Id.
41 Id. at 28,692.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
support . . . to low-income working families to sustain and improve their ability to remain self-sufficient.\textsuperscript{46}

c. DHS’s Proposed Rule Runs Counter to Congressional Intent.

In light of the above, there can be no question as to the congressional intent behind the public charge ground of inadmissibility. For more than 135 years, the term has meant an individual who is, or is likely to become, primarily dependent on the government for his or her care. In 1882, this meaning was understood to refer to individuals who could not support themselves and were likely to end up in almshouses or asylums. Today, it is understood to refer to individuals who cannot support themselves and who are thus dependent on cash assistance for income maintenance or who require long-term institutional care. These minor differences in application simply reaffirm the constancy of the term’s more general meaning—primary dependence on the government for care. Further, there is no doubt that Congress understood this to be the meaning each of the numerous times it re-employed the term in legislation since 1882. Given that Congress never altered the term’s longstanding meaning, each such implementation amounts to a congressional ratification of that meaning. Indeed, Congress expressly rejected legislative attempts to re-define the term, including in the way that DHS now seeks to do so.

Despite the above, DHS now proposes to deviate from the longstanding meaning of public charge by “redefining” the term to include anyone who receives “financial support from the general public through government funding.”\textsuperscript{47} Currently, DHS applies the term to an individual (1) who receives, or is likely to receive, the majority of his or her income from SSI or TANF benefits (or similar state or local cash assistance); or (2) who is institutionalized in primarily government-funded long-term care. DHS now proposes to generally apply the term to an individual who has used, or is deemed likely to someday use, a covered public benefit program in an amount equal to 15% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines—or $1,821 per year ($151.75 per month) for a household of one—regardless of that individual’s income.\textsuperscript{48} The list of covered public benefit programs would be expanded to include: non-emergency Medicaid (with very limited exceptions); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); Medicare Part D benefits; housing assistance, including Section 8 vouchers, Project Based Section 8 rental assistance, and public housing; and similar state or local public assistance programs.

DHS justifies these changes as “consistent with legislative history, case law, and the ordinary meaning of public charge,”\textsuperscript{49} but the proposed definition is in direct odds with all of them. First, for all of the reasons mentioned above, it is simply impossible to defend the chosen threshold of 15% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines ($1,821 per year for a household of one) as consistent with the statute, legislative history, or case law. As the INS noted in 1999, the “primary dependence” model of public assistance was the backdrop against which the ‘public

\textsuperscript{46} 1999 INS NPRM, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,677.
\textsuperscript{47} DHS NPRM, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,158.
\textsuperscript{48} With respect to non-monetizable public benefit programs, an individual would be considered a public charge if he or she has used, or is likely to use, such a program for an aggregate of 12 months in a 36-month period (or as low as 9 months over a 36-month period if both monetizable and non-monetizable benefits are used). \textit{Id.} at 51,158-59.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id.} at 51,159.
charge’ concept in immigration law developed in the 1800s.” Since then, legislators, judges, and executive officials have consistently understood the term to refer to those who are primarily dependent on the public for their care. This is of particular importance given the many times that Congress has sought to re-employ the term over the years—including in 1891, 1903, 1907, 1917, 1952, 1990, and 1996. At no time has Congress sought to widen the concept of public charge to include lesser forms of public assistance, even as the number and types of public assistance programs expanded over the years.

It is particularly indefensible that DHS would suggest 15 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines as a threshold—an arbitrary number that has no basis in statute, practice, or case law. Whatever the scope of the public charge ground, it surely cannot encompass such a figure, particularly when it is completely unmoored from the recipient’s income or other critical factors. In the NPRM, DHS concedes that “individuals may receive public benefits for [sic] in relatively small amounts to supplement their ability to meet their needs and the needs of their household without seriously calling into question their self-sufficiency.” But then it states, without citation or support of any kind, “that an individual who receives monetizable public benefits in excess of 15 percent of FPG is neither self-sufficient nor on the road to achieving self-sufficiency.” In other words, DHS is effectively saying that any person who receives approximately $1,800 per year—about $150 per month, or $5 per day—in supplemental food or housing assistance simply lacks self-sufficiency or the ability to become self-sufficient—regardless of the individual’s earnings, the location in which he or she lives, the purpose behind the assistance, or other factors. This clearly violates congressional intent.

Take, for example, an individual who earns $30,000 per year but receives about $200 per month in housing assistance from a municipal program that aims to retain certain classes of workers who might otherwise leave the municipality given rising housing costs in the area. Under the proposed rule, such an individual would be presumed to be a public charge given that he receives public benefits in excess of $1,820 per year. But deeming such an individual a public charge simply cannot be squared with any reasonable interpretation of the public charge statute. For one thing, such an individual is clearly able to provide for himself or herself. For another, the receipt of public assistance in this case is not born of necessity, which has always been a touchstone of the public charge test, but of a secondary public policy choice to improve housing options for certain classes of workers in high cost areas and maintain the competitiveness of local businesses. This and similar examples clearly illustrate just how far DHS seeks to stray from the congressional intent behind the public charge statute.

Moreover, DHS’s approach simply ignores the economic reality of the immigrant experience in the United States: immigrants have substantial economic mobility. When immigrants first arrive in the United States, their employment experience may not align perfectly with the needs of the job market. They may also have limited English language skills and social connections. They do, however, have high rates of labor force participation. Over time, their

---

52 Id.
53 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS NEWS RELEASE (May 18, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/forbrn_05182017.htm (“In 2016, the
job skills and English proficiency improve, their social connections deepen, and their incomes rise to U.S. levels. The economic mobility of less educated, and lower income, immigrants is especially strong. Immigrants with less than a high school education are able to close the income gap with their native-born counterparts faster, catching up to the native-born within six or seven years of entry.\(^{54}\) The proposed rule effectively assumes that immigrants are not as economically mobile as they actually are.

Second, and relatedly, it is also impossible to square the NPRM’s proposed expansion of covered public benefits with the statute, legislative history, or case law. As mentioned above, public charge has consistently referred to individuals who are primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. It has never been modified or interpreted to refer to the receipt of supplemental benefits that may serve purposes other than to provide primary support. As the INS noted in 1999, other types of non-cash benefits “are by their nature supplemental and do not, alone or in combination, provide sufficient resources to support an individual or family.”\(^{55}\) The agency also acknowledged another reality—that “federal, state, and local benefits are increasingly being made available to families with incomes far above the poverty level, reflecting broad public policy decisions about improving general public health and nutrition, promoting education, and assisting working-poor families in the process of becoming self-sufficient.”\(^{56}\) Consequently, the INS understood that application of the public charge statute required the agency to “identify those who are primarily dependent on the government for subsistence without inhibiting access to non-cash benefits that serve important public interests.”\(^{57}\) DHS now proposes to reverse this history in its entirety.

This reversal not only violates the clear congressional intent behind the public charge statute, as described above; it also violates decades’ worth of congressional action to expand the use of certain public programs aimed at generally improving public health, nutrition, and economic opportunity. Particularly over the past 20 years, Congress has sought to expand the use of these types of programs, including among immigrant populations, out of a recognition that greater use of such programs broadly benefit American communities. Congress, for example, has recently expanded immigrant access to various healthcare and nutrition programs, including providing access to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program in the 2002 Farm Bill and the 2009 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization.\(^{58}\) In addition, by describing health, nutrition, and housing assistance as benefits at odds with self-sufficiency, the framework in the proposed rule conflicts with the goals Congress has expressed for these programs—goals that include improving public health, food security, and housing stability to help working families

---


\(^{56}\) Id.

\(^{57}\) Id.

remain self-sufficient. The DHS framework also conflicts with choices Congress has made in Medicaid and SNAP that explicitly moved the programs towards support for low- and moderate-income workers who do not depend on government for basic subsistence.

DHS has nevertheless proposed to penalize individuals for using these legally available programs, which the Department concedes would likely discourage many from using them. This proposal contravenes our express congressional intent to expand use of these programs for the good of the American public. And it effectively chooses to penalize immigrants for congressional policy choices.


In addition to the above, the proposed rule contains additional policy choices that also contradict congressional intent. Among those are the proposed income thresholds. DHS proposes to consider as a negative factor income below 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines (“FPG”) for the applicable household size. Conversely, the Department proposes that income above 250 percent of the FPG be required to be counted as a heavily weighed positive factor. There is no statutory basis for either threshold, and the statement that 125 percent of the FPG has long served as a “touchpoint” for public charge inadmissibility determinations is deeply misleading. The cited statute refers to the income threshold for sponsors who are required to submit an affidavit of support, not to the immigrant subject to the public charge determination, and the Department provides no justification for why this threshold is appropriate. Even less justification is offered for the 250 percent of FPG threshold. These standards have no basis in the law and represent instead an attempt to achieve by regulation what the Administration previously failed to achieve through Congressional action. A standard of 250 percent of the FPL is nearly $63,000 a year for a family of four—more than the median household income in the United States. And a single individual who works full-time year round at the federal minimum wage, and who does not miss a single day of work due to illness or inclement weather, would fail to achieve the 125% of FPG threshold. This is clearly not the type of individual that Congress envisioned when it directed DHS to deny permanent status to those at risk of becoming public charges.

The proposed English language factor also violates congressional intent. USCIS proposes to consider English proficiency (in addition to employment history, education, and other skills) as a factor for admission. The immigration laws enacted by Congress, however, contemplate that immigrants who settle here permanently will develop English proficiency by the time they apply for naturalization, not at the time of admission. Indeed, Congress specifically chose to create an English language test for obtaining citizenship, and not at the earlier stage of obtaining lawful permanent residence. The proposed rule would effectively

---

63 Immigration and Nationality Act § 312; 8 U.S.C. § 1423.
overturn this policy choice, and radically alter the immigration system Congress chose to create. Among other things, the proposed rule would effectively prioritize immigration from predominantly English-speaking countries, something Congress chose not to do. It would overturn Congress’s decision to allow immigrants seeking citizenship several years to immerse themselves in the English language before applying for naturalization. And it ignores the congressional choice to provide waivers of the English language requirement at the naturalization stage for individuals with disabilities and those who have advanced age and have lived in the United States for a long time.\textsuperscript{64} In addition to being unlawful, the proposed English-language requirement will make it much harder for families to unite or remain together in this country, while disproportionately harming Latino, Asian-American, and Pacific Islander immigrants, as well as other populations with lower levels of English proficiency.\textsuperscript{65} For all of these reasons, the English language requirement in the proposed rule cannot be justified and is inconsistent with the statutory framework Congress created.

3. The Proposed Rule Would Harm American Communities across the Nation.

The proposed rule would also harm the general public. DHS admits the rule would effectively penalize individuals for receiving supplemental public benefits for which they are legally entitled. Not only does this violate the clear intent to expand the use of such programs, it would have a profound negative impact on the health, safety, and economic well-being of communities across the country. Indeed, the proposed rule expressly concedes that it may make America sicker and poorer, including through: “worse health outcomes, including increased prevalence of obesity and malnutrition, especially for pregnant or breastfeeding women, infants, or children”; “increased prevalence of communicable diseases”; “increased rates of poverty”; “increased rates of housing instability”; “reduced productivity”; and “reduced educational attainment.”\textsuperscript{66}

As DHS should know, previous revisions to the public charge statute have had a significant impact on the use of legally available benefits. Confusion related to the public charge ground of inadmissibility in the wake of IIRIRA, for example, caused significant reductions in the use of public health and nutrition program by eligible immigrants and their family members. As the INS noted at the time:

Although Congress has determined that certain aliens remain eligible for some forms of medical, nutrition, and child care services, and other public assistance, numerous legal immigrants and other aliens are choosing not to apply for these benefits because they fear the negative immigration consequences of potentially being deemed a “public charge.”\textsuperscript{67}

Evidence at the time included detailed accounts of pregnant women with gestational diabetes terrified of seeking care, a child with seizures rushed to the hospital but whose parents were

\textsuperscript{64} Id.

\textsuperscript{65} Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Migration Policy Institute, \textit{The Limited English Proficient Population in the United States} (July 8, 2015), \url{https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/limited-english-proficient-population-united-states}.

\textsuperscript{66} DHS NPRM, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,270.

\textsuperscript{67} 1999 INS NPRM, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676.
afraid to enroll in Medicaid so he could continue treatment, farmworker women afraid to enroll in a state-funded perinatal case management program, and an outbreak of rubella.68

The INS further stressed that when aliens are deterred or prevented from using a wide array of public benefits, local communities bear the costs:

According to Federal and State benefit-granting agencies, this growing confusion is creating significant, negative public health consequences across the country. This situation is becoming particularly acute with respect to the provision of emergency and other medical assistance, children’s immunizations, and basic nutrition programs, as well as the treatment of communicable diseases. Immigrants’ fears of obtaining these necessary medical and other benefits are not only causing them considerable harm, but are also jeopardizing the general public. For example, infectious diseases may spread as the numbers of immigrants who decline immunization services increase. Concern over the public charge issue is further preventing aliens from applying for available supplemental benefits, such as child care and transportation vouchers, that are designed to aid individuals in gaining and maintaining employment.69

As the INS predicted in 1999, the existence of the proposed rule has already cause significant adverse impacts in communities across the Nation.70

Congress has chosen to invest in nutrition, health care, and related services to help working families contribute to their maximum extent, including by improving their health and nutrition, helping children stay in school, and making it easier for parents to stay employed. The policies articulated in the proposed rule have already terrified immigrant families, deterring them from seeking the help they need to lead healthier and more productive lives. As DHS conceded, the rule “has the potential to erode family stability and decrease disposable income of families and children because the action provides a strong disincentive for the receipt or use of public benefits by aliens, as well as their household members, including U.S. children.” Targeting low-income and moderate income families will only exacerbate hunger and food insecurity, unmet health care needs, poverty, and other serious problems. If it moves forward, the rule will have ripple-effects on the health, development, and economic outcomes of generations to come.

The value of access to public benefits has been documented repeatedly. Multiple studies confirm that early childhood or prenatal access to Medicaid and SNAP improves health and

reduces reliance on cash assistance. Children of immigrants who participate in SNAP are more likely to be in good or excellent health, be food secure, and reside in stable housing. Compared to children in immigrant families without SNAP, families with children who participate in the program have more resources to afford medical care and prescription medications. An additional year of SNAP eligibility for young children with immigrant parents is associated with significant health benefits in later childhood and adolescence. Children in immigrant families with health insurance coverage are more likely to have a usual source of care and receive regular health care visits, and are less likely to have unmet care needs. Children with access to Medicaid have fewer absences from school, are more likely to graduate from high school and college, and are more likely to have higher paying jobs as adults. Children whose families receive housing assistance are more likely to have a healthy weight and to rate higher on measures of well-being—especially when housing assistance is accompanied by food assistance. Essential health, nutrition and housing assistance prepares children to be productive, working adults.

America’s future depends on ensuring that working families, including immigrant families and their children, succeed. We need to invest in these families, rather than put their healthy development and education at risk by destabilizing them.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.

Sincerely,


74 Karina Wagnerman, Alisa Chester, and Joan Alker, Georgetown University Center for Children and Families, Medicaid is a Smart Investment in Children (March 2017), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2017/03/13/medicaid-is-a-smart-investment-in-children/.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative Name</th>
<th>Representative Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>